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Ricardian trade theory was based on the cost of labor at a time when grain and other 
consumer goods accounted for most subsistence spending. But today’s budgets are 
dominated by payments to the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector and to 
newly privatized monopolies. This has made FIRE the determining factor in trade 
competitiveness.  
The major elements in US family budgets are housing (with prices bid up on 
credit), debt service, and health insurance—and wage withholding for financializing 
Social Security and Medicare. Industrial firms also have been financialized, using debt 
leverage to increase their return on equity. The effect is for interest to increase as a 
proportion of cash flow (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, 
or EBITDA). Corporate raiders pay their high-interest bondholders, while financial 
managers also are using EBITDA for stock buybacks to increase share prices (and hence 
the value of their stock options). 
Shifting taxes off property and onto employment and retail sales spurs the 
financialization of family and business budgets as tax cuts on property are capitalized 
into higher bank loans. Payments to government agencies for taxes and presaving for 
Social Security and Medicare absorb another 30 percent of family budgets. These 
transfer payments to the FIRE sector and government agencies have transformed 
international cost structures, absorbing roughly 75 percent of US family budgets. This 
helps explain the deteriorating US industrial trade balance as the economy has become 
financialized.  
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If trade theory is to be based on how economies work and relate to each other, it should 
focus on the financial overhead, capital movements, and tax policies that are the key to 
today’s prices payments and exchange rates. Debt taken on to buy homes (with prices 
bid up on credit) and to obtain an education, and wage set-asides for pension funds, 
Social Security, and Medicare all raise the cost of living and doing business—and hence, 
make economies less competitive. So do debt-leveraged corporate buyouts. 
  Most trade and exchange rate models have neglected these financial, rental, and 
fiscal charges ever since David Ricardo analyzed costs as if economies operated on 
barter. He claimed that debt service and military spending could not create economic 
problems, insisting that they were automatically self-financing. This approach excluded 
recognition of how debt service adds to the cost of living and doing business, and 
depresses exchange rates. Capital transfers supposedly set in motion re-stabilizing 
“corrections” enabling debt or payment outflows to be paid without disrupting price and 
income structures.  
  What is remarkable is that debtor interests have accepted this “don’t worry about debt” 
logic about “automatic stabilizers” for nearly two centuries. Forecasts promising that austerity 
will revive growth and that debt leveraging helps economies get richer faster rarely are 
innocent. They even get the direction of change wrong. When such theorizing is pursued 
generation after generation, the explanation is that special interests must be benefiting from its 
tunnel vision. 
  When it comes to minimizing the role of debt and credit, the financial sector’s 
motivation is to distract attention from the problems caused by debts growing beyond the 
ability to be paid, disrupting economies and adding to the cost of living and doing business. 
This turns economics into a public relations lobbying effort for financial deregulation. 
  One cannot discuss the roles of finance and government without the concept of 
economic rent, because rent seeking is the largest category of bank lending—and also of tax 
favoritism. Today’s academic mainstream rejects the classical idea of unearned income, 
defined as that which has no counterpart in socially necessary costs of production. But 
economic historians will recognize the concept of a free lunch as the centuries-long description 
of rentiers—bankers and landlords in the private sector. It is to this class that Keynes referred 
when he spoke of “euthanasia of the rentier” as the wave of social reform to avert future 
depressions.   
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  Post-classical economics claims that there is no such thing as a free lunch—as if 
everyone earns and hence deserves whatever income and wealth they obtain, regardless of 
how they get it. This conflates transfer payments (including outright fraud and looting) with 
productive effort. All rentier income appears to be payment for providing economically 
helpful services, equal in value to the income paid to the financial, insurance, and real estate 
(FIRE) sector. This is the concept that underlies the national income and product accounts 
(NIPA).  
  The classical doctrine now swept under the academic rug began in the 13
th century with 
the Schoolmen discussing Just Price, mainly to distinguish between fair and extortionate 
banking charges. The idea of unearned income came in time to be applied to land rent. The 
classical analysis of economic rent—whether in finance, insurance, or real estate, or even 
monopoly pricing—finds no room in today’s curriculum. The concept is muddied by turning the 
tables to depict government officials as “rent-seeking” bureaucrats increasing public spending 
and regulation in ways that increase their own power, exclusively in unproductive ways that add 
to the economy’s “deadweight” cost of doing business. Nothing about predatory FIRE-sector 
rentiers in this view!  
 
EXCLUDING DEBT SERVICE FROM TRADE THEORY—AND FROM DOMESTIC 
PRICE AND INCOME THEORY 
 
The financial sector historically has sought to make itself invisible. After all, what is not 
seen will not be criticized—or taxed. To paraphrase Charles Baudelaire’s quip that the 
devil wins at the point where the public comes to believe that he doesn’t exist, the 
financial sector’s lobbying effort wins at the point where people believe that running into 
debt contributes to economic growth rather than burdens it, and that they will end up richer 
by acting as bank customers. Debt leveraging is depicted as the easiest and even the surest 
way to accumulate wealth—going into debt to buy assets whose prices are being inflated 
on credit, or to spend in the hope of paying out of rising and more easily earned future 
income. 
  But as the dust settles from 2008, most fortunes have been made by bankers and 
brokers, largely at the expense of their clients (and as it turns out, taxpayers as well). The 
banking system’s product is debt, in a dynamic that ends with many debtors falling into  
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negative equity and forfeiting their property to foreclosing creditors. That is the legacy of 
the real estate bubble and debt-financed corporate takeovers. And internationally, debt-
ridden economies are subject to pressure from intergovernmental institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank (ECB) to impose fiscal 
austerity on their labor force, cut back public spending, and even sell off public enterprises. 
  This explains why the nonfinancial “barter” approach to trade and exchange rate 
theory pioneered by Ricardo, writing as Britain’s leading bank spokesman, denies that 
foreign payments or credit cannot cause economic problems. Bankers are depicted merely 
as oiling the wheels of commerce, providing the “neutral” means of pricing goods and 
services (pretty much ignoring asset prices), not intruding into the circular flow between 
production and consumption by extracting debt service and lobbying for rentier privileges.  
  The public relations problem that Ricardo faced was that debt service in 1815 absorbed 
three-quarters of the British government’s budget. Especially problematic was foreign debt 
taken on to finance military spending and subsidies to Britain’s allies in its many centuries of 
wars against France. The Seven Years War (1756–63) and Napoleonic Wars (1787–1815) 
sharply increased the national debt and, as Adam Smith illustrated in Book V of The Wealth of 
Nations, new excise taxes to pay for each new borrowing. Confronted with popular criticism 
of the proliferation of excise taxes to pay interest to bondholders, the political task of bankers 
was to deny the problems caused by loading down economies with debt.  
 
MOST MONEY AND CREDIT, WAGES, AND NATIONAL INCOME ARE SPENT ON 
THE FIRE SECTOR 
 
The textbook formula MV = PT means money (M) times the velocity of turnover (V) equals 
the market price (P) of the economy’s transactions (T). However, the “transactions” in 
question are limited to current production and consumption, and “price” refers only to 
consumer prices or those of other commodities—or wages. Yet by far most credit is spent on 
assets, not goods and services. Every day a sum larger than an entire year’s GDP passes 
through the New York Clearing House and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for asset 
purchases and sales. So more than 99 percent of spending in the United States and other 
financialized economies is for real estate, mortgages and packaged bank loans, and for stocks  
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and bonds. By limiting the scope of analysis to commodity prices and wages, mainstream 
monetarist theory leaves these credit transactions and their debt service out of account. 
  International payments are dominated by capital flows for direct investment, bonds 
and stocks, and bank loans and speculation. To the extent trade remains based on the cost of 
labor and doing business, rising payments to the FIRE sector also dominate. This is a far cry 
from the early 19
th century when prices reflected mainly that of food and other basic 
consumer goods. Each country’s debt overhead, housing prices, tax rates, public subsidies, 
and fiscal systems determine product prices. And foreign lending and debt service, military 
spending, and financial speculation are an inherent part of the global system affecting 
exchange rates. But despite John Stuart Mill’s analysis of how “capital transfers” affect 
exchange rates, popular discussion still calculates purchasing-power parity rates for 
McDonald’s hamburgers and other consumer goods, as if this were a measure of international 
equilibrium.  
  Some 70 to 75 percent of typical US wage-earner budgets are paid to the FIRE sector 
and to government. So economic analysis is trivialized if it only takes into account direct 
production costs reducible to labor, not taxes or “economic rent” as an element of price with no 
counterpart in technologically necessary production costs—land rent, monopoly rent (including 
bank credit-creating privileges), interest charges, and kindred transfer payments to rentiers.  
  This has far-reaching implications for how best to achieve trade competiveness. 
Neoliberals tell Latvia, Greece, and other countries to impose economic austerity by 
monetary and income deflation to cut wage levels (“internal devaluation”). But this leaves 
financial and tax structures in place. Policy discussion is limited to fiscal austerity and 
currency depreciation—but not a shift of the incidence of taxation to real estate, finance, or 
monopolies, or less regressive taxation on employment and consumption, not to speak of debt 
write-downs. What is lacking in this approach is a view of the economy as a system. Wage 
levels and interest rates are singled out as the only variables to “solve” the debt and balance-
of-payments problems. So we are dealing with a purposeful narrow-mindedness.  
  Latvia has flat taxes on employment that add up to 59 percent of the wage. Cutting this 
tax by 40 percentage points—down to about 20 percent of the wage—would double labor’s 
take-home pay (from about 40 to 80 percent of the wage). The government would make up the 
loss by raising the land tax to absorb the ground rent, and also the economic rent now being 
collected by the buyers of the formerly public infrastructure. But this rental income is the  
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preferred object of bank lending—turning rent into interest payments, mainly to branches of 
Scandinavian banks. Yet there has been little discussion of shifting taxes onto land and 
monopolies, leaving less economic rent to capitalize into interest payments, thereby holding 
down housing prices. 
  Latvia’s public-sector wages were cut by 30 percent during 2009–10 as the GDP 
plunged by over 20 percent. But cutting wages also cut employment taxes, so take-home wages 
fell only by 12 percent—as unemployment spread, turning Latvia into a neoliberal disaster 
story. Its regressive tax policy has made the nation’s industrial labor so uncompetitive that 
young adults have emigrated to find work, causing Latvia’s population to plunge by 10 percent 
(from 2.2 million to 1.9 million since the last census). 
  This demographic effect of trade deficits was well-recognized by economic writers 
already in the 18
th century. But free trade theory expurgated the linkages between trade and 
population growth, for the same reason that it conflated finance capital extracting debt service 
with industrial capital employing labor to produce goods and services: Greater realism leads to 
policy conclusions not favored. So economic theory was over-simplified. The rent and tax 
structure is taken for granted or simply treated as “exogenous,” being political or “institutional” 
and as such, excluded from the sphere of “scientific” economics proper. The resulting legacy of 
Ricardian trade theory focuses on subsistence consumption, not debt-financed housing costs, 
education, financialized pensions, Social Security, and other FIRE-sector charges. 
  A scientific body of analysis would demonstrate how financialization adds to the cost 
of living and doing business. The financial overhead consists not only of debt, but also 
compulsory saving in the form of wage withholding to pay for future pensions and medical 
care. In the United States these wage set-asides gained momentum after 1980. And the post-
2001 Bubble Economy that inflated prices on credit for housing, commercial real estate, and 
corporate ownership celebrated “debt leveraging” as raising returns on equity. But the effect 
was to absorb more of the national economic surplus in the form of debt service. 
  All nations face common global prices for fuels and raw materials, and licensing fees for 
patents such as information technology and pharmaceuticals. Trade competition reflects 
financial dynamics, economic rent, and tax policy in four main national variables: (1) labor’s 
cost of living, wages, and nonwage benefits (mainly pensions and health care), (2) land rent and 
debt overhead, (3) the incidence and level of taxation, and (4) the terms on which governments 
provide infrastructure services such as transportation and communications, Social Security, and  
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health care, along with economic subsidies. The impact of financialization and an anti-labor tax 
shift on the deteriorating US industrial trade balance, for example, is clear from the following 
rough approximation of typical American employee budgets: 
 
   Balance-sheet factors (debts taken on to buy assets rather than current output) 
    Housing (ownership or rental costs):                      32 to 40% 
    Debt service (non-mortgage)          15% 
    Private health-care and pension fund contributions       ? 
   Government tax policy structure 
    FICA withholding for Social Security and Medicare:  15% 
    Taxes (income, sales and excise or VAT)       15% 
 
  US de-industrialization—and rising motivation to invest in less debt- and rent-ridden 
economies—reflects the fact that rentier payments and taxes absorb as much as 75 percent of 
family budgets. In Germany, housing absorbs only about 20 percent of family income, half 
the US rate. So the proportion of German wages available for spending on goods and services 
(rather than being paid to the financial sector as mortgage interest) is 20 percentage points 
higher than is the case with US family budgets. This is explained partly by institutional 
factors and partly by financial practice. Germany has a tradition of rental co-ops, to which 
many families belong. Membership rents are based on current operating costs. Also, 
Germany’s construction industry is not monopolized or criminalized as it is in New York and 
other major US cities. 
  But the major differences between Germany and US real estate are financial and legal. 
European homebuyers typically must save 20 or 30 percent of the purchase price to obtain a 
mortgage, in contrast to America’s practice of 100 percent mortgages (or even a net cash 
payment to new home buyers) as the 2002–06 real estate bubble gained momentum. European 
mortgage markets also have been relatively free of no-documentation “liars’ loans” to NINJA 
borrowers (“no income, no job, no assets”) backed by crooked real estate appraisals by brokers 
and appraisers. Wholesale financial fraud has effectively been decriminalized in the United 
States.  
  US renters and prospective homebuyers in the 1970s and 1980s were panicked into 
buying at extortionate prices as residential real estate in the large cities was sold off to  
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buyers. Co-ops typically were sold with existing mortgages attached to them, with buyers 
borrowing almost an equivalent volume of new debt. Housing costs soared, prompting 
speculators to increase their share of the residential housing market to an estimated one-sixth 
by 2006. 
  Looser lending terms—lower down payments, slower amortization rates  (culminating in 
no-interest mortgages by 2006), and less regulation to keep income declarations honest—fueled 
a larger debt pyramid. Real estate or other assets are worth whatever banks will lend against 
them. And whatever the tax collector relinquishes is “free” to pay the banks to obtain mortgage 
loans. A lower tax on land rents leaves more to be capitalized into bank loans, and hence inflates 
the price of housing—while government revenue is balanced by burdening labor and industry 
with income and sales taxes. The financial sector accordingly aims to shift taxes off its major 
customers (real estate and monopolies) so as to leave more revenue “free” to be capitalized into 
bank loans and paid out as debt service. And to subsidize debt leveraging, interest is made tax-
deductible.  
  This has major implications for the how best to adjustment to international payments 
and debt imbalances. Pro-financial “neoliberal” lobbyists urge an anti-labor policy of 
“internal devaluation,” lowering wages as a means of making economies more competitive to 
“earn their way out of debt.” But the cost of labor could be reduced just as effectively by a 
tax policy that shifts the fiscal burden off employment onto property rents and other 
economic rent. 
  Failure to deal with bank loans, real estate, stocks, and bonds—and the income diverted 
away from consumption and tangible investment to pay debts—limits monetary and price 
analysis to relating the money supply and government budget to price and wage levels. Left out 
of account is the use of credit to fuel asset purchases and speculative gambles. And government 
deficits may stem from bailouts taking bad bank debts onto the public balance sheet. In 2011, 
for example, banks used the US Federal Reserve’s $700 billion Quantitative Easing (QE2) 
mainly for foreign currency arbitrage, not making it available for domestic consumer spending. 
Also left out of account are the prices at which public or private infrastructure services are 
supplied. 
  Failure to take account of debt service and government spending on anything except 
current employment affecting consumer prices makes trade theory unrealistic. But financial 
interests endorse this narrow-mindedness to promote anti-labor austerity and high interest  
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rates, and to exclude an understanding of how financialization burdens economies with 
banking and financial charges while lobbying for fiscal austerity.  
  To secure its privileges and tax favoritism, the financial sector opposes government 
power to tax or regulate. Fighting under the banner of “free markets,” it is now fighting to 
centralize economic planning power in Wall Street, the City of London, and other financial 
centers. What is remarkable is that under ostensibly democratic politics, an “independent” 
central bank has been carved out—independent from elected officials, not from the 
commercial banks whose interests it represents. Many voters believe that a financial bubble 
enriches the economy rather than turning the surplus into a flow of interest and banking fees.  
 
THE 2011 CRISIS OVER WHETHER THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANKS CAN 
CREATE MONEY TO BAIL OUT FRENCH AND GERMAN BANKS HOLDING 
GREEK GOVERNMENT DEBT, BUT NOT TO SPUR “REAL” ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY 
 
The eurozone’s stricture against central banks lending to governments has been attributed 
largely to Germany’s hyperinflation trauma in the early 1920s. The myth is the old MV=PT 
tunnel vision claiming that the problem was caused by the Reichsbank using the printing press 
to finance Germany’s budget deficit. Today’s constitution accordingly prevents the central 
bank from creating credit to loan to government. This is what psychologists call an implanted 
memory, a false image suggested in this case by anti-government ideologues.  
  Every hyperinflation in history has been caused by international payments deficits. 
For the industrial nations these deficits almost always involve foreign military spending. 
War spending also is responsible for most growth in public debt (as government budgets 
tended until quite recently to be approximately in balance during peacetime). Paying these 
debts abroad involves the capital transfers that Ricardo argued could not cause serious 
structural problems, on the myth that such transfers are self-financing!  
  But in the 1920s the Allies imposed an unpayably high reparations burden on 
Germany—largely to obtain the foreign exchange to pay the Inter-Ally arms debts that the US 
Government insisted on collecting, rather than forgiving these debts as allies traditionally had  
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done among themselves upon achieving victory.
1 The Reichsbank created German marks to 
throw onto the international currency markets to obtain the foreign exchange to pay reparations. 
France also monetized francs to obtain the dollars to pay the American Government. A 
monetary theory that looks only for links between the money supply and current production and 
consumption will fail to understand this situation. The tragic results are clear from reviewing the 
narrow-minded arguments of Jacques Rueff and Bertil Ohlin with Keynes and Harold Moulton 
in the 1920s over the roots of international instability in the way that World War I was settled 
financially. 
   The moral is that in addition to the international and financial-rentier dimensions, the 
government sector plays a key role in the economic system. This dimension is missing from 
models that limit their scope to private sector transactions and, indeed, to “current” production 
and consumption spending without reference to the purchase of assets on credit.
 The ECB’s 
operating philosophy fails to distinguish between creating money to spend on employment, 
production, and consumption in the “real” economy (affecting consumer prices, commodity 
prices, and wages) as compared to creating credit (or simply Treasury debt) to give to banks to 
buy or lend against assets in the hope that this will bolster prices for real estate, stocks, and 
bonds. The latter policy inflates asset prices but deflates current spending. 
  The $13 trillion increase in US Treasury debt in the post-2008 financial meltdown was 
not spent in product markets or employment in the “real” economy. It was balance-sheet help. 
Likewise for the ECB in 2011, pressure arose by October to violate the German constitution and 
the Lisbon agreements to buy Greek debt—the bonds that French, German, and Belgian banks 
held, along with other debts of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain). European 
financial stability came to rest on the ability of Greece and other debtor states to pay their debts, 
or to rescue banks holding these debts. This new money and debt creation has little interface 
with the “real” production-and-consumption economy, except to burden taxpayers. 
  This eurozone financial crisis of summer and autumn 2011 shows the importance of 
distinguishing between two applications of central bank money and debt creation. The first is to 
spur spending deficits “Keynesian-style” by spending on employment, goods, and services. The 
second is simply to increase balance-sheet debt without necessarily spending on current output. 
                                                       
1 I describe the reparations and arms-debt tangle in Super Imperialism (2nd ed. 1992), and the distinction 
between the domestic “budget problem” and the international “transfer problem” in my historical review of 
theories of Trade, Development and Foreign Debt (2
nd ed. 2010).  
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This policy was to give banks government bonds to add to their reserves—to buy bonds and 
make loans or, as was promised in the United States, to write down mortgage loans so as to 
pull property owners out of negative equity in order to start re-inflating real estate prices. 
  The eurozone has fallen into an intellectual trap in which banks have come to believe 
their own anti-government propaganda. Associating budget deficits only with wage and price 
inflation excludes consideration of government spending to bail out banks or provide credit to 
re-inflate asset prices (as well as creating infrastructure to hold down the cost of living and 
doing business). Opposing public social spending, German and other European banks threw out 
the baby with the bathwater by blocking central banks from doing what the Bank of England, 
the US Federal Reserve, and other central banks were created to do: finance public deficits. 
This obliges governments to borrow from banks, insurance companies, and other financial 
institutions. The resulting debt overhead leads to debt deflation that slows the economy and its 
tax yield, producing a fiscal crisis that in due course becomes a financial crisis. 
  To resolve matters, banks are backtracking and urging the ECB to make loans to 
government—for the purpose of bailing out banks and bondholders, not to spend on 
employment in the “real” economy. Voters understandably resent further bank bailouts, 
under conditions where many debtors are themselves facing foreclosure and have lost much 
of their net worth. Why should governments bail out the financial sector at the top of the 
economic pyramid but not reflate production and consumption in the “real” economy. The 
problem today, after all, is underemployment and debt deflation, not inflation. 
  Economic theorizing has not caught up with this reality. National income statistics do 
not distinguish the economy’s rentier layer from the “real” economy below it, much less how 
the wealthiest 1 percent (and especially the richest 0.1 percent) are making money at the 
expense of the bottom 90 percent or even 99 percent. Credit is depicted only as financing 
economic expansion, not leading to shrinkage and austerity. But in America the easiest way to 
make money is not by “creating jobs” but by loading the economy down with debt, inflating 
asset prices on credit, privatizing natural monopolies, and extracting economic rent in the 
form of higher access charges. None of this increases real output. But it does increase the cost 







PUBLIC OVER-INDEBTEDNESS LEADS TO PRIVATIZATION SELL-OFFS 
 
New investment and hiring taper off as rising debt charges divert income from being spent on 
current output. Economic growth slows in an S-curve, yet debts continue to accrue interest, 
which is lent out to obtain yet more interest, diverting yet more income from production and 
consumption. Slower income growth net of this debt service leads to lower tax payments 
(especially as interest is deemed tax-deductible), and hence to deepening budget deficits.  
  The financial sector’s political strategy is to use these deficits as an opportunity to 
insist that governments balance their budgets by selling off public enterprises and other assets. 
The result is a modern version of Britain’s Enclosure Movements of the 16
th to 18
th centuries, 
except that today’s version is international and driven by the financial sector. Starting with the 
IMF and World Bank, and most recently the ECB, intergovernmental financial institutions 
have gained authority over national governments. The ECB has taken the lead in telling 
Greece to sell off some 50 billion euros worth of prime tourist land, some of its islands, 
offshore oil-drilling rights, or even the Parthenon, as well as the water and sewer systems of 
Athens and other cities, the Piraeus port, and other parts of the Commons.
2  
  When the new buyers charge monopoly prices for the infrastructure being sold off, this 
increases the cost of living and doing business, turning the economy into a set of tollbooth 
opportunities. The resulting economic rent is financialized as buyers borrow from banks whose 
loan officers calculate the prospects for rent extraction available to pay interest. What the 
public sector relinquishes in user fees and taxes is made available to pay (tax-deductible) 
interest to the FIRE sector—without the public-interest dimension of public investment. So 
instead of being “neutral” in its price and income effects, credit transforms the economy’s 
structure itself. 
  A century ago US economists described public infrastructure investment as a “fourth 
factor of production”—roads and canals, urban water and sewer systems, education, the post 
                                                       
2 See for instance Andy Kessler, “The ‘Brady Bond’ Solution for Greek Debt,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2011: 
“Private buyers are increasingly skeptical of government guarantees and will demand real collateral. Credit default 
swap derivatives, which merely spread the risk, will no longer do. Some other sweetener will be needed. The 
solution? Bonds backed by real Greek assets. ... utilities, railroads, toll ways, airports, cell phone services, tourism, 
Ouzo factories, and maybe even the islands of Santorini and Mykonos. If (some say when) the Greeks default, the 
Germans or new bondholders end up with the assets, much like in a home foreclosure.” This is why the Financial 
Times’ Lex column reported (“Greece: reckoning postponed,” June 29, 2011): “the vote in parliament was held to the 
sound of rioting and the smell of tear gas.”  
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office, communications, and other publically-owned utilities that represent the largest 
category of tangible capital investment (next to buildings) in many economies. Providing 
their services at cost or on a subsidized basis (transportation) or freely (as in the case of 
roads), their returns are to be calculated not like private-sector investment in user fees relative 
to capital investment costs, but in the degree to which this infrastructure lowers the 
economy’s costs and prices.
3 
  Privatization adds to these costs by involving expenses that public enterprise rarely 
charges. These add-ons are headed by interest and dividend payments to private owners, other 
underwriting and financial fees, and much higher salaries and bonuses to the privatized 
managers, including stock options. And as part of the structural transformation of society urged 
by creditors, governments are to deregulate (or simply not put regulatory authorities in place) 
the sectors being privatized on credit. Finally, labor is outsourced, especially to non-union 
workers. On the broadest level, the world’s major financial centers replace national 
governments as economic planners allocating resources, particularly in nations that fall into 
foreign debt. 
  Financial lobbyists advise governments to sell off public infrastructure to buyers on 
credit. Equilibrium conditions are resolved when the new owners pledge the current cash flow 
of rent-extraction opportunities to the banks as interest. They then try to raise access charges 
to roads, water, power, transportation, and other public services.  
  Governments are forced into a budget squeeze by depriving them of a central bank of 
the sort that Britain and the United States have. The proper historical role of central banks or 
Treasuries is to finance government spending by creating money. This is in practice how the 
economy is supplied with money and credit which, being fungible, is used as the means of 
circulation for overall activity—the purchase and sale of goods and services, and the transfer 
of property, stocks and bonds, or other assets.  
  If central banks are deprived of this opportunity to create credit, governments must 
rely on commercial banks to finance their budget deficits—at interest. This provides a free 
lunch to banks as a result of their privilege of credit creation. To avoid crises and bank runs, 
bank deposits are insured by government agencies. This provides an opportunity for the 
                                                       
3 I describe the logic in “Simon Patten on Public Infrastructure and Economic Rent Capture,” American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 70 (October 2011):873–903. Patten was the first Professor of Economics at America’s pre-
eminent business school, the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.  
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banking system’s losses to be transferred onto the public balance sheet. Unless the bank 
insurance premiums accurately reflect this risk, such insurance represents a public subsidy to 
the banks. 
  Most important from the vantage point of national competitiveness is the fact that the 
privatization of credit creation raises the cost of living and doing business, by building in 
financial overhead charges. Privatization of public infrastructure has the same effect, by 
providing extractive rent-seeking opportunities for natural monopolies financed on credit 
rather than providing their basic services at subsidized rates or freely, financed out of 
progressive taxation. 
 
“INTERNAL DEVALUATION” OR TAX AND FINANCIAL REFORM TO MAKE 
LABOR MORE COMPETITIVE? 
 
 Economies are complex systems whose interconnections are broader than current trade 
theory takes into account. To analyze costs and trade competition requires integrating the 
“real” production and consumption economy with balance-sheet transactions in assets and 
the debt overhead, as well as with government fiscal policy.  
  The key to fiscal policy is much more than the level of taxation. The incidence of 
taxation affects domestic cost structures and determines whether the burden will fall on 
labor and its employers (increasing production costs) or on property and rent-yielding assets. 
Taxing land rent holds down the price of housing; taxing employment and sales raise the 
cost of living and doing business. Likewise in monetary policy, the terms on which credit is 
created affect the degree of debt pyramiding, while public capital investment in 
infrastructure tends to provide its basic services at a lower cost than privatization. 
  Failure to take account of these property, financial, and government balances 
leaves today’s mainstream trade theory—and above all, the adjustment policies being 
prescribed for countries in deficit—to focus crudely on labor’s overall wage rates rather 
than on the structure of family and business budgets. What neoliberal policy misses is that 
its demand for wage cuts overlooks the fact that the cost of labor may be reduced more 
efficiently by shifting the mode of taxation to focus on collecting economic rent and 
minimizing the debt overhead. This policy can reduce costs and increase competitiveness 
much less wastefully than austerity programs aimed at cutting wages and social spending.  
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The effect of neoliberal austerity programs is to shrink markets and induce emigration of 
labor, worsening international deficits rather than overcoming them. 
 
A POLICY ANTIDOTE: THE PROGRESSIVE ERA’S ATTEMPT TO WARD OFF 
FINANCIALIZATION 
 
 Financialization has reversed the Progressive Era policies designed to minimize the debt 
overhead and to minimize the economic rent-extracting opportunities that are today’s prime 
objective of bank marketing departments. The classical anti-rentier policy featured: 
 
(1) a central bank to monetize government spending deficits, rather than borrowing at 
interest from commercial banks and other creditors (e.g., as dictated by the ECB and 
the Lisbon treaty); 
(2) taxing away land rent, and enacting anti-monopoly laws and regulatory 
agencies to keep prices in line with necessary and justifiable costs of production; 
(3) keeping basic infrastructure in the public domain, providing it at cost or at 
subsidized rates or freely (as in the case of roads), with construction costs financed 
out of progressive income taxation and taxes on economic rent; 
(4) paying for pensions, Social Security, and health insurance on a pay-as-you-go 
basis rather than by financialization (pre-saving by purchasing bonds and stocks); 
(5) not permitting interest payments to be tax deductible; encouraging equity 
financing rather than subsidizing debt; 
(6) providing a national income accounting format that (a) distinguishes economic 
rent paid to the FIRE sector and monopolies, and (b) recognizes the contribution of 
public infrastructure investment to lowering the cost of living and doing business. 
 
  Countries that recently have been neoliberalized may still rectify matters by taxing 
rent and windfall gains to recover what has been appropriated or is newly created by 
infrastructure investment. They also can remove the tax deductibility of interest and 
“watered” charges, such as high salaries, and tax the fictitious transfer pricing and savings via 
offshore banking centers at the rate that normal earnings would be taxed. These are the 
classical economic policies proposed to free markets from the legacy of European feudalism  
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and conquest of the land. They remain the great tasks confronting economies today as they 
enter the End Days of the post–World War II credit/debt expansion. 
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Neoliberal (Ricardian) Theory vs. Classical-Progressive Theory 
Neoliberal Theory         Classical and Progressive Era Reforms  
 
Scope of economic theory and analysis 
Economic theory is a “science of assumptions.” 
The criterion of excellence is their internal 
consistency. 
Political economy should map empirical 
reality, not be a hypothetical exercise in 
science fiction. 
Focuses on production and consumption, taxes 
and saving. 
Focuses on wealth distribution and how debt 
creation diverts revenue from the production-
and-consumption economy. 
The economy is a single sector; all income and 
wealth are earned, reflecting their contribution 
to production and economic growth. 
The FIRE sector is wrapped around the “real” 
production economy, extracting revenue. 
Rentier income and wealth are unearned. 
Economies are best analyzed as if they 
operated on barter beneath their “veil of 
money.” Debt and financial wealth merely 
reflect this underlying economy. 
If economists ignore the financial sector’s 
autonomous behavior, they will not recognize 
its wins at the point  its existence, and hence its 
deleterious effects: debt deflation and 
polarization between creditors and debtors. 
MV=PT refers only to current output and 
commodity prices and wages.  
Monetary analysis recognizes that most credit 
is created to buy assets, so focuses on asset 
prices. 
The bankers’-eye view of the world is most 
realistic, because most wealth is financial. 
The financial view looks at how much surplus 
revenue can be converted into debt service. 
This is self-terminating, because it is parasitic. 
Debt leverage raises the return on equity.  Debt service diverts revenue away from new 
capital investment and employment. 
   
Assumes that budget deficits are spent on 
labor. 
Recognizes bailout payments to banks and 
spending on infrastructure. 
 
Political ideology 
Government planning is the road to serfdom.  Every economy is planned by somebody. 
Removing planning from government shifts it 
to the financial sector. 
Shifting planning to the financial sector and 
privatizing public enterprise on credit creates 
wealth by inflating asset prices. 
Governments should take the lead in indicative 
planning and infrastructure investment to shape 
markets to work efficiently. 
Central banks should be independent from 
democratic government. 
Making a central bank independent replaces 
democracy with financial oligarchy. 
A free market is free for rentiers, free from 
public price regulation, taxation of wealth, and 
even from public infrastructure investment. 
A free market is one free of unearned economic 
rent, including interest and financial fees, 
monopoly rent, and resource rent. 
There is a class war, and the rich have won—
mainly the financial class. Attempts to reform 
the financial or tax system will cause economic 
collapse. The alternative to oligarchy and debt 
peonage is a bureaucratic road to serfdom. 
The vested interests have fought back against 
the Progressive Era, but just as economic 
reform sought to save capitalism from the 
legacy of feudalism once, the fight can resume. 
Minimize taxes so as to leave more revenue 
“free” to pay interest to banks. 
Tax economic rent so as to hold down housing 
price inflation by leaving less “free” rent to 
capitalize into bank loans.  
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Economies live in the short run, but this is 
efficient, thanks to rational expectations. 
Short-run economics is hit-and-run. Long-term 
investment is needed to raise productivity. 
Inflating asset prices on credit is “wealth 
creation.” It increases the balance sheet.  
Inflating prices on credit simply raises the debt 
overhead—which remains in place to cause 
negative equity when the bubble bursts. 
Bubbles create billionaires, whose wealth helps 
create jobs. 
Bubbles transfer revenue and wealth from the 
“real” economy to creditors and bankers, who 
recycle their revenue into loans that indebt the 
rest of the economy to themselves. 
Free markets neoliberal style need to be 
protected by a police state and censorship of 
alternatives (viz. the Chicago Boys in Chile). 
If free-market policies require a police state, 




A free market is free of government regulation 
or taxation of rentiers. 
A free market is one free from unearned (rentier) 
income, and of monopolies and their pricing in 
excess of reasonable costs of production. 
All income and wealth is earned; there is no 
free lunch. 
FIRE-sector revenue is unearned, a reward for 
privilege, not socially necessary. 
Prefers a flat tax on employment and value-
added sales taxes. No tax on asset-price gains 
or business profits. Un-taxing property raises 
asset prices, creating balance-sheet wealth. 
Progressive taxation should fall on the highest 
property and income brackets, especially on 
asset-price gains, not fall on employment, 
because wage taxes raise commodity prices. 
FIRE revenue should be taxed at lower rates, if 
at all. 
Taxes should collect FIRE revenue, headed by 
land and resource rent, monopoly rent, interest, 
and financial charges. 
Because the rich are “job creators.”  Economic polarization destroys employment. 
By impoverishing the market, it encourages 
capital flight and emigration. 
By lowering wage levels, fiscal austerity makes 
economies more competitive.  
 
Austerity shrinks investment and makes 
countries more dependent on foreign financing.  
Austerity squeezes out more debt service.  Austerity shrinks economies, diverting revenue 
from the investment needed to pay the debt 
overhead. So the debt burden increases. 
Governments should cover deficits by selling 
off public enterprises and other assets. 
Public infrastructure investment should be 
supplied on a subsidized basis, paid out of 
progressive taxation, to lower economy-wide 
costs of living and doing business. 
Social Security and Medicare should be treated 
as user fees, paid in advance, and lent to 
government so that it can cut taxes on the 
wealthy and FIRE. 
Social spending should be paid out of the 
general budget’s progressive taxation, financed 
on a pay-as-you-go basis (as Adam Smith said 
that wars should be financed). 
Every public attempt at regulation is counter-
productive and self-defeating, because the 
market’s “rational expectations” will undo it. 
Government’s proper role is to shape markets 







Neoliberal Trade Policy      Progressive Trade  Policy 
Wage rates are the main variable. Cutting 
wages is the key to lower prices, as capital 
goods have a common world price. 
The cost of living and doing business consists 
mainly of payments to FIRE. Cutting debt 
service, employment taxes, and debt-inflated 
housing costs reduce employment overhead. 
Aims to lower wages by about 30 percent.  Reduce the cost of employment by shifting 
employment and sales taxes onto FIRE. 
Does not recognize wage/productivity 
feedback. 
Higher wages are needed to raise productivity. 
Austerity programs go together with 
privatization sell-offs to pay public debts. 
Rejects paying debts where this involves 
transforming social relations inequitably. 
Takes existing wealth distribution and 
institutions for granted. 
Foreign trade transforms economic and 
political structures, for better or worse. 
Therefore, protectionist trade policy is needed. 
Assumes that price and income adjustments 
will automatically keep trade and payments in 
balance. 
Imbalances are financed by debt, whose 
interest charges mount up to polarize the 
international economy. 
It is most efficient to specialize and depend on 
the US and EU for food imports and credit. 
Food and debt dependency lead to debt at 
interest, polarizing the global economy. 
Finance is cosmopolitan, and hence peaceful.  Finance is ultimately national, when money is 
created by central banks. 
Open trade and capital markets are peaceable, 
replacing war. 
Finance aims at what military conquest seeks: 
the land, natural resources and their rent, and 
tribute. Finance simply achieves this at a lower 
cost (= “more efficiently”) than open warfare. 
 
 
 
 